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BURUNDI: A CRITICAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Eli Stamnes and Richard Wyn Jones 
 
 
Abstract 
In the last few years Critical Security Studies (CSS) has emerged as a new approach to the academic study of 
security. This article argues that its genesis is best understood as a reaction to two developments, namely ‘real 
world’ changes after the end of the Cold War and the far-reaching philosophical debates that have recently 
been taking place within the social sciences. The authors argue for a conceptualisation of CSS based on an 
explicit commitment to human emancipation. They then illustrate their preferred understanding of security 
through a discussion of Burundi. This case study not only illustrates the theoretical claims of CSS but also 
serves as a contribution to a more comprehensive understanding of the security issues with which this 
country and its inhabitants are faced. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This article has two inter-related aims. It seeks first to outline and explain the approach to the 
study of security which has developed under the rubric ‘Critical Security Studies’ (CSS). This is 
done initially by comparing the principles and precepts of CSS to those of the more orthodox 
approach to the study of security – described here as Traditional Security Studies.27 Subsequently, 
the particular case of Burundi is explored from a Critical Security perspective. This serves not only 
to further illustrate the nature of the Critical Security approach, but also – the second aim of the 
chapter – to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the theory and practice of security in 
Burundi. 
 
Critical Security Studies 
                                                           
27 A previous draft of this section has appeared in an entry on “Critical Security Studies” prepared by Richard 
Wyn Jones and Ken Booth for The World Encyclopedia of Peace (2000). 
CSS represents an important departure in the academic study of security, strategy and peace. 
The approach owes its genesis to two coincidental developments: the end of the Cold War, and 
major debates within the social sciences as to their nature, purpose and method. Both developments 
ask fundamental questions about some of the central tenets that underpinned traditional Security 
Studies and Peace Studies alike. The vibrant and often contentious exchanges that have resulted 
 
from this period of geopolitical transformation and intellectual uncertainty look set to continue well 
into the 21st century. Nevertheless, the contours of a new approach are now clearly emerging. CSS, 
as it has come to be known, is nothing if not ambitious. Its proponents not only offer a 
thoroughgoing critique of both the theory and practice of the hitherto dominant, traditional approach 
to security (usually called Strategic Studies or National Security Studies). They also aim to provide 
intellectual support and justification for alternative security practices that can emancipate humanity 
from the fear and insecurity which dominate the lives of people across the world (Bilgin, Booth and 
Wyn Jones, 1998; Wyn Jones, 1999; Booth, forthcoming). 
 
The Critique of Traditional Security Studies 
Traditional Security Studies was in many ways a direct product of the Cold War. Despite 
ritualistic references to such great military thinkers of the past such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, the 
subject was almost exclusively concerned with superpower rivalry, and in particular its nuclear 
manifestations. It was the perceived exigencies of Cold War competition that encouraged Security 
Studies to flourish in Western academia and research institutes. Furthermore, from the late 1940s 
onwards, such was the symbiotic nature of the relationship between security specialists in academia 
and defence establishments in government and industry that some posited the existence of a military-
industrial-academic complex; each element had vested interest in promoting a militarised conception 
of relations between states. 
The ethical issues raised by this entanglement were trenchantly highlighted in the 1960s by 
such writers as Anatol Rapoport (1960; 1964; 1970) and Philip Green (1966; 1973), but equally as 
problematic for the future of human security was the state-centric conceptualisation of the subject. 
Making sovereign states conceived in rather simplistic unitary terms, the exclusive ‘referent object’ 
for the understanding of security issues had far-reaching implications. Because Cold War Security 
Studies was about states, the security of individuals was subsumed under the ambit of the state, and  
often sacrificed to the demands of realpolitik. The more secure the apartheid state of South Africa 
became, for example (in terms of strong borders and increased legitimacy for the regime) the less 
secure became the lives of the majority of the population. Security Studies, implicitly or explicitly, 
generated information and analysis for states, and specifically for the ruling elites within them (Wyn 
Jones, 1999). Security Studies within universities became an arm of statism. 
Moreover, Cold War Security Studies conceived state security in almost exclusively 
militarised terms. Security was equated with military security. True, during the era of détente and oil 
shocks from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, a broader range of issues was allowed on to the 
agenda, in recognition of the growing sensitivity of economic and environmental concerns. 
However, this constituted more of a parenthesis rather than a break; things returned quickly to 
security-business-as-usual with the re-intensification of the Cold War in the late 1970s. 
Traditional Security Studies was never without its critics. As already noted, some questioned 
whether close involvement with government was compatible with scholarly independence. But 
criticism was not confined to academia. Events such as the ‘Ban the Bomb’ marches in Britain in the 
late 1950s, support for the ‘nuclear freeze’ in the United States in the 1980s, and growing demands 
in Western Europe for ‘pan-European’ perspectives, illustrated that crosscutting differences over the 
theory and practice of security existed even within the West (see, for example, Kaldor, 1991). 
In the early 1980s, the widespread fear and disaffection created by the Second Cold War led 
to two inter-related and hugely significant developments. First, the introduction of Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles into western Europe led a massive resurgence in peace activism that challenged 
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some of the central nostrums of security policy. The newly invigorated peace movement also 
inspired and was inspired by a second development, namely the growth of ‘alternative defence’ 
thinking, which challenged the establishment and its experts on their own grounds. 
The crucial insight upon which ‘alternative defence’ was based was that the zero-sum notions 
of security prevalent during the Cold War were actually destabilising, and a major source of 
insecurity in international relations. Thus for alternative defence thinkers, real peace and security 
was not just the absence of war, but rather depended on the establishment of the conditions for social 
justice and mutual understanding – a view also shared by Peace Research. Alternative defence 
thinking concentrated on seeking means whereby the so-called ‘security dilemma’ could at least be 
mitigated. Consequently they developed such concepts as common security, non-offensive defence, a 
nuclear freeze, military confidence building, democracy and disarmament, ‘détente from below,’ and 
alternative security orders. Surprisingly perhaps, it was ultimately in the Eastern bloc that these ideas 
were to have most impact. The principles and precepts of ‘alternative defence’ directly influenced 
the ‘new thinking’ that emerged in the Soviet Union after 1986 under its new leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev (Risse-Kappen, 1994, Wyn Jones, 1999). Despite being condemned in many Western 
capitals for being hopelessly deluded and idealistic, alternative defence thinkers played a crucial role 
in the ending of the Cold War. 
 
Towards a Critical Security Studies 
Given the symbiotic relationship between the Cold War and Security Studies, it is not 
surprising that the end of the former led to a crisis in the latter. Not least among the factors that have 
led some to call for a fundamental rethink of the way security is conceptualised has been the 
inability of ‘security specialists’ to respond adequately in the face of the new – or old, but hitherto 
neglected – issues which have emerged since the late 1980s. These issues have forced all but the 
most hidebound to reconsider what we actually mean when we use the term ‘security’, and what is 
the appropriate ‘referent object’ for security discourse (the contours of the ensuing debate can be 
traced through the following collections: Lipschutz, 1995; Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1995; 
Brown, Coté Jr., Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1997; Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1995; Krause and Williams, 
1997; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998 28; Booth, forthcoming). Proponents of CSS have 
combined an eagerness to explore these crucial issues with a commitment also to reconsider the 
methodology by which security should be studied (Krause and Williams, 1997; Wyn Jones, 1999). 
Again, the influence of the alternative defence thinkers of the early 1980s is important here. They 
had been concerned to support and influence those social movements that had emerged to protest the 
continuing superpower arms spiral. In doing this they had broken fundamentally from traditional 
security specialists who had often claimed a spurious objectivity and detachment for their work 
while in reality their teaching and research legitimised the prevailing status quo by making it into a 
‘false necessity’. 
                                                           
28 It should be noted that the portrayal of CSS offered by  Buzan , Wœver and de Wilde is to say the least 
contentious, and in our view, descends into caricature, but to pursue this issue fully is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Through their rejection of simplistic notions of ‘detachment’ and ‘objectivity’, alternative 
defence thinkers were precursors of a much more widespread move in the social sciences to question 
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the very nature and purpose of social research (Bernstein, 1988). While such questioning has been 
vigorous, there has been little consensus as to what might constitute acceptable answers. This is 
reflected in CSS where there is disagreement, for example, between those who follow such post-
structuralist thinkers as Foucault and Derrida and those who are more persuaded by the arguments of 
Critical Theorists such as Horkheimer and Habermas. Whereas the former group of scholars focus 
largely on deconstructioning/de-essentialising claims about security, the latter group’s theorising 
also involves a reconstructive element. Nevertheless, whatever their differences in focus and 
methodology, all proponents of CSS seem to regard the ultimate aim of their work as aiding in the 
transformation of prevailing patterns of power and domination in favour of those who are currently 
disempowered and disenfranchised. In the case of the post-structuralists, this purpose is usually 
implicit in their work – to be read ‘between the lines’ as it were (but see the discussion in chapter 4 
of Wyn Jones, 1999 for a more detailed survey). However, in the case of thinkers influenced by 
Critical Theory, this intent is recognised in terms of an explicit commitment to human emancipation. 
It is within this latter strand that this article has its basis. 
As well as introducing a new level of methodological awareness and sophistication into 
Security Studies, proponents of CSS have also re-worked the key concept of ‘security’ in important 
ways. In doing so they have provided new answers to such central questions as: What is security? 
Whose security should we be concerned about? And, what is the purpose of studying security? The 
answers to these questions provide the basis for the claim of supporters of CSS that it represents ‘the 
next stage’ in this new era of world politics. 
     
What is security? 
As we have already seen, Traditional Security Studies understood security in almost entirely 
military terms. This may have had a certain logic during the period of nuclear, mutual assured 
destruction (MAD). However, even then, this understanding did not produce a conceptualisation of 
security that spoke the concerns of the vast majority of the world’s population living in the Third 
World: for them a broader conception of security always made more sense. In the wake of the end of 
the Cold War, the narrowly militarised understanding of security simply became anachronistic. The 
vocabulary of nuclear deterrence, arms control, limited war and superpower crisis management had 
minimal relevance in a world in which the salient security concerns increasingly related to ethnic 
conflict, refugee flows, famine, peaceful settlement of disputes, the politics of identity, confidence-
building, humanitarian intervention, conventional war, and so on. A narrowly militarised 
understanding fails to grasp the complexity of the ‘new’ issues on the security agenda, not to 
mention their life-and-death relevance to many people on the planet. 
Published in 1983, Barry Buzan’s seminal study People States and Fear was the first 
sustained attempt from within Security Studies to re-draw a broader notion of security that moved 
beyond a purely military focus. Although still arguing within a state-centric framework, Buzan 
argued that by paying disproportionate attention to the military dimension, analysts ignored other 
issues which were of equal importance when it came to understanding how policy-makers and 
populations alike perceive their security interests. In response, he proposed to broaden the 
conceptualisation of security to include four other ‘sectors’ in addition to that of the military: these 
were political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. This influential formulation has been 
criticised. Some traditionalists argue that adopting a broader conception of security will dilute the 
coherence of Security Studies (Walt, 1991). Some radical critics are wary of the danger that labelling 
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issues such as environmental degradation as ‘security concerns’ will lead to their militarisation 
(Deudney, 1990). However, these arguments have been forcefully countered by those who favour the 
‘broadening of security’. On the one hand they have pointed out that the parsimoniousness of the 
traditional approach has blinded analysts to the inter-relationship between different threats, or in 
Buzan’s terms, between the different sectors. Thus one of the consequences of rejecting any attempt 
to narrow the analysis through an arbitrary definition is to allow for a more variegated and realistic 
assessment of the dynamics of security. Interestingly, a broader notion of security also echoes what 
is increasingly becoming the explicit practice of states. Even Britain, for example, now distinguishes 
between ‘defence policy’, which focuses exclusively on the military dimension, and ‘security 
policy’, which takes a broader view incorporating economic and trade issues. 
In response to worries that ‘broadening security’ runs the risk of militarising the new issues 
incorporated onto the security agenda, supporters argue that broadening is itself part of a move to 
promulgate a different understanding of security: this understanding rejects the zero-sum notions 
prevalent during the Cold War (Wyn Jones, 1999). 
In addition to supporting moves to broaden notions of security, proponents of CSS have also 
called for its ‘deepening’. Deepening involves the recognition that security is a derivative concept 
(Walker, 1997; Booth, 1991, 1997). That is, our conceptions of security depend on the particular 
philosophical world-view we have. Traditional Security Studies was based on an often-implicit 
understanding of a world characterised by a continual struggle for power among sovereign states 
competing in an anarchical international system. According to this understanding, inter-state conflict 
is endemic and is destined to remain so, and this should establish the character of Security Studies. 
However, while this view may have achieved the status of ‘common-sense’ among Cold War 
security specialists, this is far from being the only possible world-view. When conceptions of 
security are derived from alternative perspectives – those of Feminists, Marxists, World Order 
thinkers and so on – very different understandings of ‘security’ emerge. Recognising the derivative 
nature of security, CSS has sought to expose and criticise the world-view that has underpinned 
traditional Security Studies and explore the understandings of security that can be built on the basis 
of possible alternatives. To this end CSS is concerned to explore regional security questions, 
including those of a military character, and promote thinking about practical policies to advance the 
security of people as individuals and groups (Booth and Vale, 1997). 
     
Whose security? 
One of the most pervasive assumptions underlying traditional Security Studies is state-
centrism. State-centrism privileges the role of the state in world politics, regarding it as the sole 
legitimate focus for decision making and loyalty. The state became the only referent object of Cold 
War Security Studies. Strategic problems were analysed in terms of their impact on states. ‘National 
security’ was stressed as opposed to the security of individuals, groups of one sort or another, civil 
society, world society or common humanity. The justification for this was the doctrine that the state 
provides security for its own citizens. However, even a cursory examination of the empirical reality 
of world politics exposes the fact that this is a hopelessly idealised view (Booth, 1991; Reus-Smit, 
1992; Wyn Jones, 1999). States tend to prioritise threats to their own security and often end up 
neglecting those posed to individuals, groups within the state, and certainly humanity as a whole. 
Indeed, in many cases, the state itself is one of the main threats to the security of its own population. 
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This fact is all too well confirmed by the widespread pattern of state-sanctioned political oppression, 
human rights violations and torture.  
Rather than continue to privilege states as the referent object for Security Studies, proponents 
of the Critical approach have argued that the concept of security should be extended to referents 
other than the state. In his influential essay on ‘Security and Emancipation’ (1991), Ken Booth 
insisted on the need for analysts to view states as means rather than ends in themselves. That is, 
while states may in some cases be providers of security, and are certainly a crucially important 
element in the politics of security, this does not mean that they should be privileged as referents for 
the theory and practice of security. Booth argues that the ultimate referent for security should be 
individual human beings. This formulation has not won universal acceptance even in the Critical 
camp. Some, for example, have suggested that ‘civil society’ is a more appropriate referent. 
However, given that making individuals the ‘ultimate’ referent for discussion of security concerns 
does not preclude – in fact, encourages – consideration of the boarder contexts in which human 
beings live their lives, the logic of favouring the individual referent is particularly strong (for an 
extended discussion of this issue see Wyn Jones, 1999). 
 
What sort of Security Studies? 
In addition to challenging the way in which security has been conceptualised, CSS also offers 
an alternative understanding of the meaning and purpose of studying security in the context of 
universities. As we have noted, behind a veil of spurious detachment and objectivity, traditional 
Security Studies has served the interests of statism and official thinking. Ultimately the subject has 
legitimised and supported the interests of those who benefit from the status quo, on both a local and 
global scale. CSS follows in the tradition of alternative defence thinking by regarding itself as 
thought in the service of ‘bottom-up’ progressive social change. Robert Cox (1981: 128) has 
famously argued that “all theory is for someone and for some purpose”. If this is the case then CSS 
is primarily for those made insecure by the prevailing order. In Critical Theory terms, its purpose is 
to aid in the process of their emancipation. 
 
Critical Security Studies and the future 
The traditional, Cold War approach to security has attracted many critics, though it is still 
resilient in many institutions. CSS is perhaps best understood as an attempt to bring together these 
various strands of criticism and to weld them into a coherent whole. A variety of different 
approaches have important contributions to make to the CSS project: the work of the Peace 
Researchers in widening the concept of violence and emphasising the positive conception of peace, 
the work of alternative defence thinkers in focusing on ‘common security’ and ways of mitigating 
the security dilemma, the work of critics within Security Studies in broadening the security agenda, 
the role of Third World specialists in emphasising the role of the structure of the international 
economic system in engendering insecurity in the South, the insights of feminists in underlining the 
relationship between the personal, the political and the international, and demonstrating the 
centrality of identity politics to the understanding international phenomena, the analyses of Critical 
Theorists in exposing traditional approaches to theory and in outlining a theoretical approach 
explicitly oriented towards human emancipation, and the work of World Order theorists in outlining 
alternative visions of attainable and sustainable world orders (Booth, 1997). 
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By bringing these strands together, underpinning them with greater methodological 
sophistication, and providing new direction and greater coherence, CSS hopes to become an 
important voice informing and legitimising those political practices which promote security, 
community and emancipation for the whole of humanity (Booth, forthcoming). However if this 
extremely ambitious aim is to be achieved, the Critical Security perspective must do more than assist 
analysts in clarifying conceptual and meta-theoretical issues – although this is undoubtedly 
important – it must also prove its ability to throw new light on empirical studies. While the task of 
applying the conceptual insights of CSS to ‘real people in real places’ is still in its relatively early 
stages, prominent proponents of the approach such as Ken Booth and Peter Vale (1997: 329) are 
explicitly aware that it is the success of this venture that will determine “if critical security studies 
are to flourish and lead to a revisioning of security in world politics”.29 The following discussion of 
Burundi’s security situation represents our own modest contribution to this effort.30 It seeks to 
demonstrate how both ‘broadening’ and ‘extending’ the concept of security is necessary in order to 
understand the security issues that concern the people of this benighted central-African state. 
Furthermore, it will seek to demonstrate the (potential) utility of fastening upon some of the areas of 
unfulfilled potential that exist within the specific Burundian situation in order to edge developments 
in Burundi in a more emancipatory direction.  
 
Burundi: whose security? 
“Disputes – international : none” – so reads the section dedicated to Burundi in the 1997 CIA 
World Fact Book. This suggests that when viewed from the perspective of Traditional Security 
Studies with its stress inter-state military conflict (actual or potential), this was a country whose 
affairs were of little relevance to the concerns of security analysts. In the intervening period, 
Burundi seems to have become embroiled in the chaos in its neighbour to the west, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and may thus now fall under the remit of Traditional Security 
Studies. However even in 1997, it would seem to be a particularly perverse form of Security Studies 
that did not recognise that Burundi was beset by the most serious of security problems. As will be 
seen below, sudden violent death had been an ever-present threat for the Burundian population 
during the previous five years. Moreover, the chronic insecurity of the 5.5 million inhabitants was 
further compounded by their country’s extreme poverty (see for example Amnesty International, 
1997;  1998; Evans, 1997). 
                                                           
29 We should note that proponents of Critical Security Studies realise that the tasks of conceptualisation and the 
application of concepts to concrete empirical examples are dialectically inter-related. Their conceptual framework is not 
regarded as immutable but is rather subject to transformation in the light of practice (Wyn Jones, 1999). 
30 Please note that this article deals with the situation in Burundi up until the autumn of 1998. 
Burundi provides a striking empirical example of the inadequacy of the traditional security 
paradigm. Let us first consider the issue of the appropriate referent object for Security Studies. The 
traditional focus on the state was justified, in familiar contractarian terms, on the grounds that the 
state provides for the security of its own population (Krause and Williams, 1997). In the words of 
Osgood and Tucker (1967: 284), the state was regarded as the “indispensable condition of value”. 
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The example of Burundi not only serves to refute this assumption, but totally reverse the terms of 
debate. For ever since Burundi gained its independence in 1962, the state has been the major source 
of insecurity for the greater proportion of its population. Most horrifically, on several occasions the 
state’s armed forces have carried out massacres during which tens of thousands have been 
slaughtered. 
This endemic insecurity is a result of the deep ethnic and socio-economic fissures in 
Burundian society. Since independence, with the exception of one short period in the 1990s, Burundi 
has been ruled by Tutsi dominated governments. The Tutsi form a minority (approximately 14%) of 
the population, and successive governments have maintained their domination over the Hutu 
majority (approximately 85% of the population) by ensuring their “near exclusion […] from public 
life, knowledge and wealth” (Reyntjens, 1993: 563). In this sense, Burundi has provided a mirror-
image to neighbouring Rwanda. There the Hutu majority (the proportions of both groups are broadly 
similar in both countries) has dominated the Tutsi for most of the period since the revolution of 1961 
and the break-up of Ruanda-Urundi (Lemarchand, 1970). But despite this difference in the balance 
of power between both groups, the post-independence history of both states has been equally grisly.  
Since Burundi gained independence it has been convulsed by regular bouts of violence: 
coups have been the ‘normal’ means of securing (intra-Tutsi) regime change, while several Hutu 
uprisings have attempted to challenge discrimination and oppression, in turn sparking extremely 
violent reactions by the armed forces. In the ensuing spirals of killings and counter-killings hundreds 
of thousands have been forced to flee, with each violent episode serving to further solidify and 
harden the intercommunal boundaries. The result is that Hutu-Tutsi divisions, while historically 
caste-based, have taken on the appearance of being timeless, primordial and intractable ‘ethnic’ 
divisions, and Hutu-Tutsi relations have come to be perceived in purely zero-sum terms 
(Lemarchand, 1970; Reyntjens, 1993; Evans, 1997). 
In 1972 the state’s reaction to a Hutu uprising may be properly characterised as genocidal. 
The uprising was a reaction to the arrest and killing of the former King of Burundi, Ntare V, by the 
regime that had deposed him in 1966 and established the first republic under Michel Micombero. In 
reaction to his killing, groups of Hutu who felt themselves to be increasingly discriminated against 
by the regime attacked military centres around Burundi. This triggered brutal reprisals. In the 
following weeks Hutu were systematically slaughtered, with members of the Hutu ‘elite’ – 
essentially anyone with education or in a position of leadership and responsibility – being 
particularly targeted. This latter group included all Hutu officers and most of the Hutu soldiers in the 
armed forces; most Hutu teachers, nurses, students, secondary school pupils, business men and civil 
servants were also killed. Priests were another target due to the Church’s role in education and 
political life. Thus the Hutu were effectively decapitated; their organic leadership hunted down and 
slaughtered as part of a sustained campaign of murder which left a death toll of between 150,000 - 
250,000 and forced more than 100,000 to flee the country (Malkki, 1995; Lemarchand, 1989). 
In comparison to the horrors of 1972, events in 1988 appeared to be something of a 
watershed in inter-communal relations in Burundi. Then international reaction to yet another 
massacre in August of that year, forced the President, Major Pierre Buyoya, to change course.31 
                                                           
31 The  memories of the 1972 genocide are important in explaining the motivation for the killings in the 
communes of Ntega and Marangara in 1988 (Lemarchand, 1994; Malkki, 1995). The arrest of several Hutu and 
unannounced army manoeuvres were interpreted as an attempt to repeat the 1972 atrocities, and as a result a number of 
Tutsi were killed in reaction (Lemarchand, 1989; Evans, 1997). The armed forces reacted in their now all-too-familiar 
Eli Stamnes and Richard Wyn Jones 45 
 
Ethnic divisions were recognised and a reconciliation program was established. This included the 
appointment of a Hutu Prime Minister and the creation of a Cabinet with equal numbers of Hutu and 
Tutsi portfolios. A ‘Commission to Study the Question of National Unity’ was established and 
resulted in a charter approved by referendum in February 1991. This was followed by work on a new 
constitution, which also was approved by referendum eleven months later. New political parties as 
well as an independent press emerged, and the recruitment practices for civil servants and the 
admission examinations for secondary schools were changed in order to encourage Hutu 
participation (Lemarchand, 1989; Reyntjens, 1993; Chretien, 1996; Des Forges, 1995). This process 
continued despite efforts to obstruct it from both the armed forces and extremist Hutu (from the 
PALIPEHUTU movement). Many Hutu gained employment in the state apparatus, and the 
proportion of Hutu within the higher education system increased. Indeed refugees who had been 
living in Tanzania since the 1972 genocide began to return, such that in 1993, an arbitration 
programme was established to deal with the disputes over property that might arise from this process 
(Mallki, 1995: 284; Des Forges, 1994: 205). Undoubtedly the highpoint of this period of 
reconciliation were the first democratic presidential and legislative elections held in June 1993. 
These were won by Melchior Ndadaye and the FRODEBU party, winning 65% and 71% of the vote 
respectively (Reyntjens, 1993: 567-572). Further hopes were raised by the new president’s 
conciliatory attitude towards the former president Buyoya, the UPRONA party and the Tutsi in 
general. However, these hopes were violently dashed when President Ndadaye, together with his 
three possible successors, were all killed in a coup d’etat, after merely 100 days in office. (Des 
Forges, 1995: 207; Evans, 1997:27) Yet again, the perpetrators came from within the armed forces. 
In the following days these forces went on to kill thousands more. Yet again this instigated a wave of 
killing and counter-killing which left around 50,000 dead and forced almost a million to flee (Des 
Forges, 1994: 203; Malkki, 1995: 285-6).32  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
manner, causing 50,000 to flee. Total numbers of deaths is estimated at 1,500 (Malkki, 1995; Chretien,1996). 
32 The estimates of the death toll in these killings vary greatly - from 30,000 (Des Forges, 1994) to 100,000 
(Malkki, 1995; Chretien, 1996). There are also significant variation in the literature as to which group suffered most. 
Malkki (1995) claims that most of the killed were Hutu; Des Forges (1994) suggests the losses for the Hutu and Tutsi 
may have been equal; while Chretien (1996) concentrates on the killing of Tutsi. There is also some variation concerning 
numbers of refugees, but it is clear that a majority of them fled to neighbouring countries, while a proportion fled to other 
parts of Burundi. 
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Quite apart from the general challenge to people of conscience everywhere that the horrors of 
Burundi undoubtedly should provide, it is a history which confronts Traditional Security Studies 
with fundamental and thorough-going questions about its conceptual framework. For this is an 
example, in extremis, of that framework’s normative and empirical failings. In the Burundian 
context, it should be apparent that any attempt to privilege the state as the provider of security is 
simply grotesque. Moreover, Burundi also forces proponents of the traditional approach to confront 
difficult – even existential – questions over who or what constitute a state? Who does a state consist 
of when, as in the case of Burundi, ‘its’ inhabitants are regularly forced to flee the country in their 
tens and hundreds of thousands? These Barundi live abroad for years, while simultaneously refugees 
from the neighbouring countries settle in Burundi.33 Are these refugees a part of the state? And if so, 
of which state? Given the statist assumptions of Traditional Security Studies, these questions would 
seem to be of crucial of importance. But whatever the theological niceties of the discussion, it is 
clear that any serious discussion of security in this area must give central consideration to the fate of 
these refugees. Refugees loom large in the Tutsi’s fear of Hutu revenge, and these ‘outside elements’ 
have often been blamed by the state or it’s supporters for fomenting rebellion (Malkki, 1995; 
Chretien, 1996). These accusations contain within them a kernel of truth in as much as it is clear that 
refugees from the different countries in the Great Lakes Region have been instrumental in fomenting 
violence in other countries (see Evans, 1997 for more details on this). All of which underlines that 
the traditional simplifying assumption of a basic congruence between state borders and the 
boundaries of various societies is not only untenable but also empirically unhelpful (see Wæver et 
al., 1993 who distinguish between state and society in the European context). To treat the different 
states as distinct, discrete units in any simple neorealist sense is in fact highly misleading. 
Given the problems with privileging the state as the referent object for any discourse on 
security in Burundi, what then of other candidates for the role of referent object? One obvious 
candidate is ethnic identity given that the situation in Burundi is often understood in terms of an 
‘ethnic conflict’. 
It can hardly be denied that understanding Burundi’s catastrophic post-independence history 
in ethnic terms throws a certain light upon event there. As has already mentioned, the character and 
implications of the country’s ethnic divisions became rapidly more divisive and murderous in the 
immediate aftermath of independence. Three linked developments were of particular importance: the 
assassination of a Hutu Prime Minister in 1965, the success of Hutu candidates in subsequent 
legislative elections, and the coup in 1966 which replaced Burundi’s constitutional monarchy with a 
Tutsi-dominated, one-party regime (Lemarchand, 1970; Chretien, 1996). Historically there had been 
long-standing social divisions between the Hutu, Tutsi and a third category, the Twa, which 
represent 1% of the population. These divisions were largely caste-based – the Tutsi were 
predominantly pastorialists, the Hutu predominantly cultivators and the Twa predominantly hunters, 
potters and ironworkers – with the Ganwa (‘the princes of the blood’), a noble caste of Tutsi, 
standing at the top of the socio-economic pyramid. A feudal system revolved around the kettle 
clientship, with its intricate system of mutual rights and duties between patron and client. This was 
separate from and subsidiary to a decentralised political structure, in which local Ganwa chiefs 
shared power with the king. But it is nonetheless important to note that this intricate social pattern 
did allow movement from one ‘ethnic’ category to another, and that intermarriage was not unusual 
                                                           
33 Barundi is the plural for the Burundi people, while Murundi is the singular term. Kirundi is the language 
spoken in Burundi (Lemarchand, 1970: xiii). 
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(Lemarchand, 1970; Des Forges, 1994; Malkki, 1995; Evans, 1997). It was in many ways the 
colonial powers, Germany and Belgium, who solidified and exacerbated the divisions between Hutu 
and Tutsi. They magnified the political importance of ‘ethnic’ distinctions during their drive to ‘tidy 
up’ the existing structures of governance, whose end-result was to privilege the Tutsi.  
Since the most recent attempt to transcend ethnic divisions by fostering a sense of ‘national 
unity’ was brutally crushed in October 1993, ethnic divisions have taken on an even greater 
importance.34 At least 150,000 have been killed in the violent conflict motivated overwhelmingly by 
ethnic differences (Evans, 1997: 9). Reyntjens (1993: 582) claims that “ethnicity has re-emerged as 
the single most important factor of political life” and the United Nations commission who 
investigated the assassination of President Ndadaye concluded that an ‘overwhelming majority’ of 
the Barundi identified themselves with either the Hutu or the Tutsi category (Evans, 1997: 22). In 
this context arguments that the Hutu-Tutsi distinctions are not ‘really’ ethnic, and that the ethnic 
ideology is based on “a confusion between concepts of race and class” seem to miss the point 
(Chretien, 1996: 206; Makinda, 1997; Des Forges, 1994). For even if these distinctions have little 
‘objective’ basis, conflict based on the perceived differences between Hutu and Tutsi continue to 
have deadly consequences (Lemarchand, 1994).35 
Does the undoubted importance of ethnic identities in the ongoing conflict in Burundi justify 
focusing on these identities as the referent object in any security analysis of the country? In our view 
the answer is no, and this is for at least two reasons. First of all to do so, as  Bilgin et al. (1998) has 
pointed out, would be to logically confuse agents and referents. While ethnic identity is clearly a 
very important element of the security problematique in Burundi, to privilege it as the referent object 
for security is merely to reintroduce all the problems identified with the privileging of the state at 
another level (Krause and Williams, 1997; Shaw, 1994). Moreover, and relatedly, to privilege ethnic 
identity, underpinned as it is in this case by a particularly pathological ‘self-other’ distinction, would 
be to privilege exactly that which needs to be removed or at least ameliorated for progress towards a 
more sustainable and secure environment to be made. Secondly, to understand Burundi purely in 
terms of Hutu-Tutsi conflict is effectively to silence other aspects to the conflict: these include the 
socio-economic aspects already alluded too, intra-group conflict, and the situation of the Twa. The 
latter group is almost always ignored by analyses of the conflict with much of the literature 
suggesting that they are not interested or active in politics and that they can thus be safely ignored. It 
is however far from certain that the Twa’s security interests would be served by ‘adding’ them to a 
discussion which focuses on ethnic identities. This is because the ethnic characterisations 
(stereotyping) of the Twa tend to be extremely negative, focusing as they do on the Twa’s ‘pygmoid 
features’ and alleged intellectual deficiencies  – the Twa are regularly seen as “half-monkeys” 
(Malkki, 1995: 21, 29-30). In this context, fastening upon and further privileging ethnic identities 
seems likely merely to reinforce these stereotypes. 
For these particular reasons, as well as the more general reasons alluded to in the first part of 
this article, the ultimate referent object in the following discussion will be the Burundi individual – 
                                                           
34 It has been claimed that political discourse in Burundi had already become ethnicised before October 1993 
when, towards the end of that year’s election campaign, ethnic distinctions were stressed in order to galvanise political 
support (Des Forges, 1994: 205; Chretien, 1996: 208; Evans, 1997: 25-26).  
35 This is not to imply that work to ‘denaturalise’ the Hutu-Tutsi division is of merely esoteric concern. Rather it 
can play a part in a long-term strategy which aims to transcend the divide. In this context, work like Lemarchand’s 
Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice (1994) is potentially very useful. 
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the Murundi.36 It is interesting (and indeed heartening) to note in this context that the Cairo 
Declaration which resulted from the 1995 African Heads of State summit declares that “the security 
of individuals was a fundamental problem in Burundi” (Evans, 1997: 34). 
 
Security for the Murundi  
                                                           
36 See note eight. 
Focusing on individual security as the ultimate referent object in any attempt to understand 
the theory and practice of security inevitably opens up a ‘broader’ conception of security as well, for 
it is not only issues related to military security which impinge upon any individual’s security 
situation (Wyn Jones, 1999). Therefore other security concerns will also be discussed in the 
remainder of this article which will review the contemporary security situation as it affects the 
Murundi before suggesting some possible ways forward. However, given the catastrophic effects of 
the on-going uncivil war, the section will begin by focusing on the seemingly endless spiral of 
ethnically based violence.  
Even though the attempted coup in 1993, during which President Ndadaye was murdered, did 
not succeed as the junior officers who carried it out were disavowed by the Chief of Staff, it did 
generate a debilitating vacuum in Burundian politics. Surviving members of the government 
gradually re-emerged from foreign embassies where they had sought refuge from the coup and 
subsequent massacres, but almost three months were to elapse before a new president could be 
sworn in and a government established. Moreover, despite the consensual character of the new 
government based as it was on power-sharing between a Hutu President and Tutsi Prime Minister, 
the mutual mistrust between both groups grew as ethnically motivated violence continued (Des 
Forges, 1994; Chretien, 1996: Evans, 1997). Like his predecessor, new President Ntaryamira was 
destined to enjoy only a brief period in office as he was killed when the plane carrying him and 
Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down outside Kigali on the 6 April 1994. This action was 
the signal for the start of the appalling genocide in Rwanda. In contrast Burundi initially remained 
relatively calm. However, the situation was extremely tense. Yet another Hutu, Sylvestre 
Ntibantunganya, was elected President by the National Assembly, while the country’s Constitution 
was suspended and replaced by a Convention of Government. However, this could not halt 
Burundi’s slide towards civil war. Indeed some analysts have argued that the suspension of the 
constitution and the establishment of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) 
along with its armed branch the Front for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) were partly responsible 
for the deterioration in the situation (Chretien, 1996: 210; Evans, 1997).  
Since then fighting between the armed forces and various groups of Hutu militia, massacres 
of (predominantly Hutu) civilians, arbitrary detention and torture have all become commonplace. By 
the summer of 1996 Burundi’s internal situation deteriorated to the extent that African state leaders 
decided to give security assistance to the country. This in turn was the prelude to yet another military 
coup. President Ntibantunganya was forced to flee and the perpetrators of the coup offered the 
Presidency to former President Buyoya. Since then, although Buyoya has gradually introduced 
various conciliatory measures at the political level under considerable external pressure, the violence 
and distrust between both sides of the ethnic divide has continued (Evans, 1997: 36-7; Amnesty 
International, 1996). A cease-fire between all groups involved in the fighting agreed on the 20 June 
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1998 has had little or no effect (Burundi-Bureau, 1998b; Radio Burundi, 22 June 1998). As a result, 
the life of almost every Murundi is currently characterised by extreme insecurity. 
That said, it is important to understand that this insecurity is not only a function of the fear 
generated by living in a country roamed by marauding bands of killers – uniformed or otherwise. 
Rather this insecurity is manifested in areas of life not normally considered to fall within the 
purview of security specialists. One good example is housing. Housing is usually regarded as a 
welfare issue, but in Burundi regroupment camps (regroupés) are central to the security concerns of 
individuals and their families. 
Since early 1996, civilians from rural areas have been forced to leave their homes and settle 
in so-called regroupment camps. The government has claimed that this has been for the civilian’s 
own protection because of the ongoing fighting (Amnesty International, 1997: Evans, 1997: 39). 
However, people have been kept in the camps long after the fighting in their areas has subsided, 
fuelling the suspicion that the regroupment policy is based more on a desire to isolate Hutu rebel 
groups from potential and actual supporters than to protect the civilian population. There is ample 
evidence to support such suspicion. Population movement seems to have been effected almost 
entirely through coercion in operations often characterised by arbitrary arrests, rapes and massacres. 
Subsequently many have ‘disappeared’ from the camps and Amnesty International (1997; 1998) 
have concluded that these have been victims of extrajudicial executions. Moreover, the camps have 
proved to be anything but secure for their inhabitants. They have been subject to countless attacks in 
which hundreds have been killed and raped, and the hygiene and health conditions inside are almost 
uniformly appalling. Finally, several camps have been connected to systematic attempts at political 
indoctrination in which residents have been “re-educated” or “de-toxicated” (Amnesty International, 
1997; Burundi-Bureau, 1998a). 
The government argues that both Hutu and Tutsi are equally affected by the regroupment 
system, but in fact most Tutsi live in so-called displaced peoples camps (déplacés). Although the 
conditions within these camps are equally unhealthy and unhygienic, there are crucial differences 
between them and the regroupment camps, most notably in terms of freedom of movement. Whereas 
the residents in the regroupés are not allowed to leave their camp or have had restrictions placed on 
their movement, the inhabitants of the déplacés can move freely, and indeed, move from the camps 
if they so wish. Hutu fears that the regroupment policy is intended to effect a permanent shift in 
settlement patterns in Burundi are heightened by the fact that many of the residents’ properties were 
burned and destroyed shortly after they were taken away to the camps. Furthermore, the few who 
have been allowed to leave the camps have been resettled along roads and not allowed to go home. 
Several hundred thousand people in Burundi live with insecurity generated by this situation 
(Burundi-Bureau, 1998a; Amnesty International, 1997). 
The Burundian judicial system represents another major source of insecurity for individuals 
in Burundi. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out during his visit to Burundi in May 
1998, this is a system in desperate need of reform (see UN Press Release, 1998). Far from 
conforming to the tenets of impartiality and fairness, the judicial system is virtually totally 
dominated by Tutsi. According to Albert Mbonerane (1997: 3) they use the judiciary as “an 
instrument of repression in the service of the government” instead of as “the guarantor of impartial 
application of the law”. This abuse became even more commonplace after July 1996 when Buyoya 
took power. The already suspended constitution was abolished and the judiciary and legal system 
even further politicised. This has resulted in great and manifest injustice for the Hutu. Hutu are not 
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allowed legal representation, and it has been widely claimed that many are tortured in order to make 
them confess to crimes they have not committed (Amnesty International, 1998). There are great 
inequalities before the law. Tutsi are often set free after having committed the same crimes for which 
Hutu are executed. Court cases which result in execution sentences often do not take more than a 
few hours (Mbonerane, 1997; Amnesty International, 1998). The courts are arenas where any 
meaningful concern for justice has been replaced by a desire to reinforce ethnic supremacy 
(Mbonerane, 1997; UN Press Release, 1998). All of this is compounded by the fact that many judges 
are inexperienced and without proper qualifications. This, together with the fact that legal texts are 
written in French – a language that only 10 % of the population understand – adds to the arbitrary 
character of the system (Mbonerane, 1997; Amnesty International, 1998). This ethnically-biased 
judicial apparatus adds yet another layer of insecurity to the daily life of the Murundi. 
Other factors impact in equally profound ways on individual security in  Burundi; in this case 
factors, namely poverty and starvation, tend not to respect the boundaries between ethnic groups. 
Again these are issues which Traditional Security Studies has tended to regard as lying beyond it’s 
intellectual remit, but when individual security is placed central stage it is clear that they create 
extreme insecurity for very many individuals. 
As Burundi is not blessed with many mineral resources, its economy is predominantly 
agricultural. Coffee is its main export product and represents 80% of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings. This makes the Burundian economy very vulnerable to changes in the world market. 
Otherwise, 9 out of 10 inhabitants depend on subsistence agriculture, which means that the security 
to plant, tend and harvest crops takes on especially crucial importance (Des Forges, 1994: 203; 
Malkki, 1995: 20). An economic reform programme was introduced in 1991 but has had no effect as 
the civil war has effectively ruined the economy with crops destroyed, population displaced and 
fertile land rendered unsafe or inaccessible by the conflict. Malnutrition and the diseases that thrive 
among a famine-weakened population have become commonplace, especially so in the camps (Des 
Forges, 1994: 206; Malkki, 1995: 287; Evans, 1997: 20; UN Press Release, 1998; Burundi-Bureau, 
1998a). Quite apart from the direct effects on the subsistence economy, the insecurity in Burundi has 
slashed coffee revenues further damaging an already debt-burdened economy. All these problems 
have been further compounded by the external reaction to the 1996 coup when that many aid donors 
withdrew their support and neighbouring countries imposed economic sanctions (The Economist, 
1996; Makinda, 1997: 382; Evans, 1997:20, 36). However, Burundi’s economic problems and the 
resulting insecurities should be seen in a broader context than that of civil war and sparse resources. 
Even without these debilitating specific problems, Burundi would still be massively disadvantaged 
by the iniquities and inequalities of the world economic system. 
 
Possible pathways towards emancipation 
CSS rejects the ‘scientific objectivist’ conception of knowledge on which Traditional 
Security Studies is based and argues instead that “both the subject and the object of scientific 
activity are socially constituted” (Dubiel, 1985: 104; Wyn Jones, 1999). One implication of this is 
that all theories whatever their claims to the contrary, prioritise and privilege certain actors and 
organising principles: or in Robert Cox’s (1981:128) well worn phrase, “all theory is for someone 
and for some purpose”. In the Burundian context, the whole aim of any CSS understanding of the 
situation will be to generate knowledge which can assist in some way in emancipating the men and 
women of that country from the insecurity and fear in which they find themselves. Within the given 
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space-constraints, we are not in a position to develop a full analysis here. What we will attempt to do 
in this final section is therefore to suggest the methodology through we would suggest that 
emanicpatory possibilities may be identified and then provide some empirical examples. 
Methodologically, the critical approach underpinning CSS holds that there is no simple 
causal explanation of the cause or causes of conflict; neither is there a solution (or solutions) which 
can simply be applied universally. Neither does it posit emancipation as an end-point – a destination 
which can be arrived at and at which history will somehow come to an end. Rather a Critical 
Security approach, with its stress on immanence, focuses on the development of unfulfilled 
potentials within the actual conflict situation as it stands, as part of an emancipatory process (Wyn 
Jones, 1999). 
When it comes to potential pathways to a more emancipated Burundi, a few routes suggest 
themselves which could form part of such an emancipatory process. The ongoing negotiation process 
in Arusha, Tanzania is plainly one. The most recent round of talks took place on 13-22 October 1998 
and was the third such meeting in a process which started on 15-21 June 1998 and continued on 20-
29 July 1998. They included representatives of the Burundian Government, the political parties (both 
the internal and external branches) and the armed groups involved in the fighting. The negotiations, 
chaired by the former Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, were organised around the 
following themes: “the nature of the Burundian conflict”, “democracy and good governance”, “peace 
and security”, and “development and rebuilding” (Burundi-Bureau, 1998c). From a Critical Security 
perspective it is interesting to view these negotiations in the light of Habermas’ notion of unfulfilled 
potential, namely the potential for reaching mutual understanding (and potentially at least, 
accommodation) through undistorted communication inherent in speech (Wyn Jones, 1999; Jones, 
2000). To what degree are the parties to the discussion engaged in a genuine and inclusive attempt to 
promote dialogue with the aim of developing mutual understanding? Or are some or even all merely 
engaged in a cosmetic exercise in order to placate various constituencies either within or external to 
Burundi while hoping for (an ultimately unobtainable) violent solution? Obviously the answers to 
these questions are difficult to gauge without direct access to the talks and the participants. However 
there are at least some positive signs that there is increasing consensus both about the negotiations 
themselves and their contents. The government, the National Assembly and the FRODEBU party 
signed a partnership agreement in the summer of 1998 agreeing to co-operate in peace efforts, and 
Buyoya was sworn in as President by the National Assembly. This latter development is potentially 
significant as the National Assembly is the only ‘survivor’ from the 1993 political reforms and was 
part of the structure overthrown by the 1996 coup (Pitman, 1998). Another potentially significant 
straw in the wind is that elements of Burundian civil society have shown interest in participating in 
the negotiation process, and  this question was put on the agenda for the October 1998 round of talks 
with several civil society groups travelling to Arusha to make representations to the delegates. 
Among these were women’s groups hoping to promote the inclusion of more women into the peace 
efforts (Agence France Press, 1998; Burundi-Bureau, 1998b; 1998c). However despite these positive 
signs, there is also much cause for caution before jumping to any overly-optimistic conclusions. 
There remains dissent about the talks within the various parties to them and fighting still persists. 
In addition to this ‘grand-plan approach’ to attaining a more just and secure environment for 
the Barundi, there are also smaller scale initiatives which might well make a positive contribution. 
One is a civil society-based initiative which is attempting to ameliorate and even transcend ethnic 
boundaries by establishing a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic radio station. Radio is a very powerful 
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medium in a country where the transport infrastructure is poor, where most political activity takes 
place in the hills among a dispersed rural population, and where other means of communications are 
scarce (Malkki, 1995: 20). It played an important role in the genocide in 1972 when it was used to 
encourage Tutsi to kill their Hutu neighbours. ‘Hate radio’ has been used by both sides for the same 
purpose during the civil war over the last five years. However, groups within civil society have 
started broadcasting programmes aimed at building trust and securing reconciliation between the 
groups. An American Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), Search for Common Ground, has 
initiated a project where Hutu and Tutsi journalists work together. The hope is that through co-
operating in a work environment these journalists will begin to view each other as individuals and 
fellow professionals rather than simply representatives of rival ethnic groups, and that this will result 
in a spirit of tolerance which will then be communicated to the listeners (Des Forges, 1994: 204; 
Evans, 1997: 40). This and other similar radio initiatives may help to prepare the ground for a more 
general process of communication and reconciliation within Burundi. 
Other potentially important ‘grass-roots’ initiatives have concentrated on involving new 
actors in the process. One example is the Center for Women, established in January 1996, again by 
Search for Common Ground. This has worked to encourage and facilitate the participation of women 
in the work for peace. The centre’s efforts range from providing administrative infrastructure and 
meeting facilities to training women in peaceful conflict resolution techniques. Women from the 
different regions and ethnic communities have been encouraged to discuss and promote 
reconciliation within their families and communities. In this way, individuals and groups who are 
not traditionally considered as ‘political’ actors are included in the communication process, 
something that may further reinforce and dynamise the negotiations taking place at both national and 
provincial levels (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1998). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This article has attempted two tasks. First it attempted to outline and explain in general terms 
the approach to the study of security that has become known as CSS. In particular, it stressed how 
CSS eschews the traditional approach’s concentration of the military dimension of state security and 
concentrates instead on a more holistic understanding of individual security concerns – that is on 
how CSS both ‘broadens’ and ‘extends’ the orthodox understanding of security. It then illustrated 
these arguments by way of a discussion of Burundi. This served not only to provide an empirical 
illustration of the necessity of reconceptualising security, but also to provide a more coherent 
conceptual framework for understanding that benighted country’s problems. 
It may well be objected that many analyses of Burundi already adopt this expanded 
conception of security as their starting point. This is an argument that we would certainly accept but 
would make two points in response. First, while it has long been the case that area specialists often 
utilise such a conception, much conceptual work in International Relations and Security Studies is 
still mired in idealised models of international politics, which are neither ideal nor representative of 
reality. While this situation persists there remains the need to emphasise points that some may well 
regard as obvious – even ‘common sensical’.  Secondly, the major advantage of the CSS approach is 
the consistency and self-reflexivity of its theoretical framework. Much important empirical work 
lacks this and as a result suffers from logical lacunae or contradictions. By outlining a broad 
theoretical framework within which security can be properly understood, CSS can give empirical 
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work greater direction and hopefully maximise its positive impact. For above all else, the example of 
Burundi illustrates the need to develop alternative strategies for attaining human security. 
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